I negotiated Britain’s Brexit deal – this is my biggest regret

Former PM Theresa May has told the BBC that Andy Burnham should “move on” from Europe and that “Brexit is done”.

But that assumes the question of how Britain works outside of the EU is settled – and as someone who worked with May on her Brexit deal, I can assure you it isn’t. Burnham’s deal in Brussels, signed this week, only highlighted this uncomfortable truth.

It felt that way back to 2016 too, when I worked as Chief of Staff to David Davis in Downing Street, focused on EU negotiations. It was a febrile time: I flew with PM May to Brussels in November 2018 to to sign the EU-UK Withdrawal Agreement and shape our future relationship with the continent. Parliament then rejected that proposal. Eight Parliamentary votes later, still none commanded a majority.

Looking back, one lesson stands out: it is extraordinarily difficult to negotiate a relationship with Europe when you haven’t first agreed at home what you want that relationship to be. We were trying to settle the terms of Britain’s future while the country was still arguing about what that future should look like.

The two positions remain as hard to reconcile now as in 2016. Remain and Leave still talk of apples and oranges, impossible to compare or weigh against each other. Want national economic growth, global opportunities, and a European counterweight to China and America? Vote Remain. Prioritise Parliamentary sovereignty, national identity and control over immigration, with the US and Asia as future partners? Vote Leave. Ultimately, the choice probably depends on your values – a feeling in your bones. The hardest human trait to change, the hardest to compromise – which meant negotiating a deal to please all sides was impossible.

The difficulty was that there wasn’t one negotiating table, but several. There was the formal negotiation with Michel Barnier and the EU, but also the parallel battle to keep the Tory sceptics in the European Research Group onside, maintain public support and reconcile competing views within government – between PM Theresa May, Chief Negotiator Olly Robbins and Secretary of State David Davis. A concession to one audience could make a deal less acceptable to another.

As a result, neither economic vision truly won. Leave won the referendum, but it didn’t settle the argument about what Britain’s economic relationship with Europe – or the rest of the world – should look like. Stuck between poles, the UK has ended up in a halfway house.

Our departure means the old model is gone. In 2020, we gave up access to the single market: frictionless trade, free movement, and a say in shaping the rules of our largest neighbouring market. In return, we regained greater national autonomy over regulation, trade agreements, external tariffs and immigration policy. That freedom gave us an opportunity to build a new model – radically deeper relationships with growth markets. A free-wheeling, free-trading nation making deals with US technology firms, fast-growing Asian economies, and Commonwealth partners.

But in reality, Britain hasn’t fully chosen either.

A decade on, the geography of British trade remains largely unchanged. The EU remains our largest collective trading partner. Its share of our exports was 42 per cent in 2015 – and 41 per cent in 2025. It still accounts for 49 per cent of UK imports. Geography has been hard to escape, with entrenched supply chains, transport links and business relationships. UK businesses must still meet EU rules to access that market – but now outside the EU, Britain no longer has a say in creating them.

There have been new opportunities – trade agreements with Australia, New Zealand and India, and through the Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership. But they haven’t replicated the depth of single-market integration, and the economic gains have so far been relatively modest.

To make the most of our new freedom, we must commit to deeper economic relationships overseas. But our exit hasn’t freed Britain from difficult trade-offs – we now just choose who we make them with. The US will still demand we meet their regulations, with difficult choices about imports of chlorinated American chicken. The same is true for Singapore, Australia and China. We can choose which markets we want to serve, but we can’t dictate the rules they apply to us.

For businesses, dealing with multiple regulatory systems adds complexity and cost. Companies can adapt to different rules, but they need to know which ones they’re investing in. When the direction of travel keeps changing, investment becomes harder – and future growth suffers.

We’ve given up a particularly deep form of integration with our biggest trading partner in exchange for the freedom to pursue a different economic model. But 10 years on, we’re still deciding what sort of economy Britain wants to be. Freedom is only valuable if you know what you want to do with it. Like chips at a casino, the point isn’t to accumulate them; it’s to place a bet.

And without a clear strategy, we end up negotiating individual improvements: a bit more rule-taking for access here, a sector-specific agreement there. Each one may make sense individually. But collectively, they don’t add up to a coherent model.

The question Burnham must answer isn’t how to reduce the friction on food and drinks, or align with EU carbon credits – it’s deciding what we plan to do with our newfound freedom. And if we can’t answer that, we must ask whether the price of having it is worth paying.

Original source I negotiated Britain’s Brexit deal – this is my biggest regret

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