The US is expected to hold further peace talks with Russia and Ukraine in the weeks ahead, but doubts are deepening over whether America will ever be a reliable partner for Kyiv in its war with Moscow.
Donald Trump met Vladimir Putin several times this week at the high-profile summit in China, with the Kremlin saying Putin was in an “excellent mood” after speaking to the US President about issues including the conflict, and Trump confirming that the pair had a “great relationship”. Meanwhile, the US President has been highly critical of Volodymyr Zelensky’s staunch defence of Ukrainian national interests.
Earlier this week, deputy Pentagon chief Elbridge Colby criticised Ukraine for its long-range strikes against Russia. The comments were dismissed by Germany’s defence minister, Boris Pistorius, as “stupid” – asking why the US had not made the same criticism of Moscow.
Though Washington transferred primary responsibility for directly aiding Kyiv to Europe in 2025, it has retained an uncomfortable influence over Ukraine – as disruptions with intelligence sharing and the Starshield satellite functioning have made clear.

And as Trump looks increasingly friendly with Putin on the world stage, the US team has emerged as a proponent of the “might makes right” principle within the peace process, hinting that Ukraine will have to make major concessions over the Donbas region to get an eventual settlement since time is on the Russian side, which is bigger and more powerful.
No wonder that only 7 per cent of Ukrainians approve of US leadership – while 79 per cent of Ukrainians have negative view of it, given the track record of this second Trump administration in the Russia-Ukraine conflict.
American domestic politics is actively followed in Ukraine because the country still depends on the US both for aid and for political support, with the White House central to the peace process.
People in Ukraine cheered the Democratic win in the midterm elections, hoping that Congress would from January restore checks and balances in DC. But will it change much for Ukraine?
Democrats will certainly initiate many investigations and hearings, which will consume much of the Trump team’s time and attention. There are solid chances that US negotiators in the trilateral peace process – Steve Witkoff and Jared Kushner – will have to spend more time in Washington after January, answering questions from lawmakers on their dealings instead of mediating Russia-Ukraine negotiations.

The Democratic Party, supported by the internationalist wing of their Republican counterparts, is likely to strictly enforce the Graham act – passed in September to increase diplomatic and economic pressure on Russia. It may even force other sanctions against Moscow. But the federal government can be reticent when legislators force its hand on sanctions – just look at how reluctant the first Trump administration was to implement new harsh measures on Russia.
With the Democrats controlling Congress, Ukrainian authorities might be bolder in defying questionable US initiatives in regard to an eventual peace settlement with Russia. Likewise, with Democratic oversight, there is unlikely to be another situation like one recently in which the Secretary of War, Pete Hegseth, spent a month refusing to greenlight a shipment of vital antiaircraft munitions to Ukraine funded by Europe.
Despite Zelensky’s claim this weekend that Starshield restrictions were causing problems in Ukraine, chances are good that, with congressional support, Kyiv will be able to renew the agreement on its usage on favourable terms without major delay under the new Congress in 2027.
But to have consistent support among US lawmakers, Ukraine will need to build its case among newcomers, as many seasoned Republican and Democratic politicians who supported Ukraine will be leaving office. This task will be complicated given the absence of a proper ambassador for Ukraine in DC.
The Democrats would be wise not to appear overly Ukraine-centric in their approach, since that would allow Republicans to easily discredit their opponents as too internationalist and consumed with other nations’ fortunes instead of prioritising US needs. Trump did it in the 2024 campaign against Kamala Harris and it worked with the nationalistic American electorate.

Though there are reports that some political observers expect a $15bn (11.4bn) package of US aid to Ukraine to be approved by the new Congress, it looks highly unlikely under current conditions in America. Republicans managed to drive the US population to the conclusion that it is primarily Europe’s responsibility to support Ukraine. Returning to the period when the US directly supported Ukraine through Congress as it did under Joe Biden is close to impossible now. Overall, US voters largely supported Democrats during the 2026 midterms, not because they would like to see more interventionist US foreign policy, but because they felt betrayed by those who touted “America First” and then launched a war of choice against Iran, which resulted in higher fuel prices.
Despite pro-Ukrainian sentiments and a desire to balance Trump, a Democrat-controlled Congress won’t solve one of the direst problems facing Ukraine – the acute deficit of US produced Pac-3 MSE interceptors to deal with Russian ballistic missiles because of Iran. The US now has less than 1,000 interceptors, and production rate is approximately around 600 a year. Ukraine’s request for at least 300 fell on deaf ears. A recently signed contract for 500 interceptors for Ukraine will not be implemented until the early 2030s.
Expectations of a major American tilt towards Ukraine and Europe given the Democratic electoral wave in the US are likely to prove overblown. Congress might restrain the worst instincts of Trump and his team towards Kyiv, and in some cases, legislators might drive a more favourable US agenda for Ukraine – but there are limits to such a proactive approach. Anyone who expects major positive changes in the US approach towards Ukraine in war and diplomacy may be disappointed.
At best, the new US Congress may give Ukraine and Europe a somewhat better environment to more easily adjust to the post-American world, with its demand to take care of ourselves.